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Ill THE SUPRE~IE COURT 0F THE STATE OF UT/\Y 
----~ ~~~-~---------~-~---
Irl THE i'l/\ TTG~ OF STEVEII KUH~IHI\USEI•I, 
Petitioner. 
PETITiml FOR /\D'1ISSFlil TO 
:mm ERSH I D HI THE UT,~H 
STATE 3/\R 
Case ~lo. 15692 
BRIEF OF UTAH STATE BAR 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This matter is on apoeal from a rulinq by the Board of 
Commissioners of the Utah State Bar that the oetitioner has failed to 
satisfy the requirement that he be of ~ood ~oral character, and is 
thus denied admission to the Utah State Bar. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Petitioner requests a reversal of the rulinq of the Board 
of Commissioners and an or~er requirino his admission to the Utah 
State Bar. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Petitioner presents a recitnl of the facts involved in the 
Introduction of his Brief. The first oaraaraph therein refers to a 
hearin~ before the Character and Fitness Committee of the Utah State 
~ar. Since a record of those ~roceedinqs was not made is not before the 
Court at this time in the record on apneal, we can only refer to the 
notice sent to petitioner, •.<hich states that the named committee 
"cannot certify the applicant is of approved aood r10ral character and 
Qeneral fitness to practice la\'1." (Record, p. 36). This notice also 
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advised petitioner of his riCJht to a further :1earinr], 1·1hich ri'lht 1.1as 
exercised by petitioner· by the filin~ of a Fomal RerJUest for Hearinq 
with the Executive Director of the Utah State Gar. (Record, o. 35). 
Subsequently, counsel for petitioner filed a motion to exclude certain 
evidence. (Record, [1. 19). In part, petitioner sought to exclude 
any and all evidence pertainin~ to an arrest and conviction which were 
later reversed and for which an order of expunnement issued. This 
part of petitioner's motion was nranted. Petitioner also souqht to 
exclude evidence which pertained to the expunged matter, but could be 
introduced into evidence without reference to the arrest, etc. 
Specifically, the issue was whether or not evidence could be admitted 
which was obtained from a search and seizure subsequently declared 
illegal under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
in State criminal proceed'ngs. The Hearinq Officer ruled that this 
evidence was admissible. 
In the evidentiary hearin~ the above rulin'ls were adhered 
to. Petitioner rresented evidence as referred to in his Brief - his 
testimony and that of three members of Bar who testified as to oeti-
tioner's good character. Rather than continue the date of the hearing, 
the Bar and petitioner stipulated to admission of the testimony of 
Larry Hedberg, 11ho could not attend the hearing. Hedber'l'S stipulated 
testimony was that in June of 1976 he had observed a~oroximatelv one 
pound of marijuana and a lesser amount of cocaine in the a~artment 
beinq rented by the oetitioner. The Bar also offered as evidence the 
application to the Bar of the petitioner. (Exhibit l of transcript). 
Petitioner had stated in that aoplication that he had b?en accused of 
"smoking pot" in 1963 while in the '·1arine Corps, awl later r·eceived an 
-2-
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undesirable discharge, which was later u~~raded to a qeneral discharge 
and then to an honorable discharqe. On cross examination, each of the 
character witnesses offered bv the oetitioner stated that in his or 
her opinion, use of marijuana or cocaine is not, bv itself, sufficient 
reason to exclude someone from membershia in the Bar, because of lack 
of moral character. 
EVIDENCE OFFEr.EO BY THE S.l\'1 '.JAS P~OPERLY 
1\DI'IITTEO .1\,'10 DEl 'lOT DE.'IY DETITIO:IER A 
FA!~ AriD PIP!'_'\TIAL HE."'~ I 'I~. 
It is true, as stated in Petitioner's Brief, that the Bar's 
investi~ator obtained copies of the arrest, conviction, and subse-
quent expun~ement orders of the petitioner. It is also true that 
these materials should not have been orovided bv the court for the 
investi~ator. However, it is not true that this was the only source 
of the information which led to denying petitioner admission to the 
3ar. ;~o 1vhere in the record is that stated. To the contrary, the 
investi')ation by the Bar ~1as actuall;• initiated by a call from a 
licensed member of the Bar to the Executive 8irector. Petitioner's 
counsel 1·1as informally told of this, but it also does not aopear of 
record. 
The Bar did not rely on nor even utilize the exounced 
matters in the evidentiary hearinq. The Hearinn Officer did, however, 
allow use of the HedberQ testimony, althou~h it consisted of observa-
tions durin') a search and seizure later declared illeqal under the 
-3-
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Fourth Amendment. This issue was arnued at some length orior to the 
evidentiary hearing. (~ecord, ~~- 8-31). The Sar arcued then, and 
does so aqain, that the exclusionar'; rule as first established in 
'la;Jp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1971), is not aoolicable to Gar aorlicant 
proceedin~s so as to prevent use of evidence obtained in a search 
later declared ille~al. The purpose of the exclusionarv rule is to 
deter police officers from coniuctinn illegal searches. This purpose 
is adequately served bv preventinq the use of tainted evidence in 
criminal oroceedine~s. lJ,s stated in United States v. ,lanis, 428 
u.s. 433 (1976): 
... the "prime purpose of the rule, if not the sole 
one is to deter future unla•.-1ful police cond•Jct. ... in 
sum, the rule is a judiciallu created remedy desianed to 
safer.Juard Fourth /\mendment rights generally throuqh its 
deterrent effect, rather than a oersonal constitutional right 
of the oarty aggrieved .... as with any remedial device, 
the aoplication of the rule has been restricted to those 
areas where its remedial objectives are thouoht most 
efficaciouslv served." at 456, quotin~ United States v. 
Calandra, 4H U.S. 338 (1974). 
The Court found that the ~oal of deterrence was sufficientlv served 
bv excluding the illeaallv seized evidence in the state criminal 
proceedings. As a result, the evidence was allowed to be used in 
Internal '(evenue Service proceedinos. Si:'lilarlv, in the case of 
r~orale v. Griqel, 422 F".SUt)O. 938 (D.C.~!.H. 1976), the COUl't held 
that the exclusionary rule did not aD~ly to colleqe disciplinary action 
based on evidence of marijuana use obtained in a warrantless search. 
In examining the Janis rule, this court stated that "The Supreme 
Court clearly intends to limit the exclusi0narv rule to criminal 
proceedinas and to allow onlv a crimin3l defendant to invoke its 
protections." 
_,1_ 
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Thus, the Hearing Officer pro~erly found that the exclu-
sionary rule was inapplicable, and that the testimony of Larrv Hedberg 
was admissible. The petitioner had previously been extended the 
benefits of the exclusionary rule in the criminal proceedin~s through 
dismissal and expungement. He was not entitled to the further aopli-
cation of the rule in the Bar proceedings, which are essentially 
civil in nature. 
I I 
THE DECISION OF THE SOARD OF C0i111ISSIONERS 
WAS FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND 
SHOULD BE SUSTAINED HEREIN. 
This Court has elucidated the following standard in its 
review of Bar disciplinary cases: 
This court has previously stated that it would look upon 
the findings and recommendations of the Bar Commission 
with indulgence and would not disregard its action unless 
there was something to persuade this court that the Comm-
ission had acted capriciously, arbitrarilv, or beyond 
the scope of its power or was plainly in error. 
In re Badger, 27 Utah 2d 174, 493 P.2d 1273 (1972). 
Presumably, the same standard applies in Bar application cases. 
It is clear from the record herein, that the Bar Commission did not 
abuse its authority in finding that the petitioner Vias not qualified 
for admission to the Bar. 
Petitioner's evidence of good moral character consisted 
of his own testimony and that of three members of the Bar. The tes-
timony of petitioner included information about his educational 
and employment background. (Tr. pp. 5-6). He described in some 
detail his work as a para-professional law clerk at Utah Legal 
Services. (Tr. pp. 6-9). He denied ever having committed or havin:J 
-5-
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been accused of coPmlittin'] anv 'lets 1·:hich 1·121'e dishonest or contr.J.l''/ 
to the Code of Professionill :~esnonsibil i~·' in connection 1·1ith his 
dealinr1s 1·1ith clients at Lenal Services. (Tr. p. ll-12). 'Jurino 
cross examination, the ~etiti0n~r further stated t~at in his oninion 
he had not engaged in any activities in his ~ersonal life in contra-
vention of the code of ethics. (Tr. p. 13). 
The three witnesses who testified on behalf ~f the oetitioner 
all had worked with him at Utah Legal Services and all are members 
of the Utah State Bar. Each testified in large oart as to the poeti-
tioner's professional competence. ~one addressed soecifically the 
moral qualifications of the ~etitioner. In fact, none of them reallv 
had much contact with the petitioner outside of their on-the-job 
activities. Thus, petitioner's orima facie case of moral character 
consisted only of his own stJtements and those of colleaoues relating 
:Ji·i:~arily to PI'Ofessiun~l an:l intellectual carl3bilities. 
Cross examination of the three char.J.cter witnesses revealed 
that their opinions as to the oualification of the oetitioner were 
tainted by their opinions concernin~ the use of ille~al drurs and 
its relationship to Bar membershio. The first witness, 3arney Sesas, 
testified as follows: 
"!') [•1r. Gesas, in your ooinion, is a nerson 1·1ho uses 
marijuana mor.J.llv fit to be a member of the Utah 
State Bar? 
A You're askinc me h~00thetically 7 
Q In your opinion. 
t; r~y opinion, I •·IOuld SoV I d0n't think that "IOUld 
constitute nrornl tun'i tude in cl'' ooi nion ~s a 
basis for denial of admissi0n to the Bar. 
Q In your opinion, is a :Jerson 1·1ho uses cocaine r~orally 
-fi-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
fit to be a member of the Bar? 
A The question you asked me is if someone uses cocaine 
would I deem them fit for admission to the Bar on 
the o,rouncls of moral fitness? 
Q Correct. 
A 1·1y answer 1'/0ul d be probably. I 1·10ul d have to kn01·1 
the totality of the person, their work product. 
would 0enerally say, if that was an isolated situation, 
that person were known to use cocaine, I would probably 
want to explore it more. But I would qenerallv 
say I don't think that's a basis to deny admis~ion. 
My reason for that is that the use o~ that drug--
I'm not personally familiar with it; I have only 
read about it--that's a consensual type of action. 
Someone is not imposing on others, is not profiting 
by it. 
I'm not espousing that it should be legal, but 
I'm saying I would want to look further into that 
person. That alone I would not use as a basis to 
deny admission to the Bar. 
(Tr. pp. 22-23). 
Another witness, James T. Massey, testified as follows on cross: 
Q Mr. Massey, in your opinion is a person who uses 
marijuana morally fit to be a member of the Bar? 
In your opinion, is a person who uses marijuana 
morally fit to be a member of the Bar? 
A That being the sole criterion, a person who has used 
it? 
Q Who uses marijuana. 
A It would be difficult without knowing what you 
mean "uses." 
Q 
A 
Q 
Smokes marijuana. 
In terms of frequency. I think a Person-- I'll 
answer that question, no, not necessarily. I don't 
think it automatically disqualifies peorle from being 
fit to practice law the way the question was posed. 
In your ooinion, is a person who uses cocaine morally 
fit to be a member of the Bar? 
-7-
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A \'JOuld hilve thP sa111e ans'.-JC'r." (T1·. rJp.34-3S). 
The last character witness, Potricia De Michele, state1 as follows: 
"0 Patty, in you1· Of.Jinion, is a [)erson •.-1ilo uses 
marijuana morally fit to be a me~ber of the Gar? 
A In C)eneral? 
Q Yes. 
A Yes , I bel i eve so . \·!ell , I 1·10 u l d qua l i f y t h a t by 
sayin~, all things bein~ eaual, that alone ~ould not 
in my mind make sor~eone unfit. 
0 In your opinion, is a person \vho uses cocaine morally 
fit to be a member of the Bar? 
A With the same kind of qualificiltions? 
0 Same. 
A Yes." 
(Tr. op. 40-41). 
The Bar presented the testir10ny of Larrv Hedberg. r·lr. Hedberg 
\•las unable to atte~1j the i1earing, but in the interest of havin') the 
issue resolved both parties stipulated to the content of that 
testimony. The testimony was as follows: 
.. in June of 1976 he was in the apartment of the 
applicant, Mr. Kuhnhausen, and in that apartment he 
observed approximately one pound of marijuana and a 
lesser amount of cocaine. (Tr. p. 42). 
Also olaced in evidence by the Bar as Exhibit l, \'Jas the 
"Applicant's Questionnaire and Affidavit" filed 1·1ith the Utah State 
Bar by the petitioner. The document was identifiej by the netitioner 
as having been filled and signed by him. (Tr. o~. 12-13). Ouestion 0 
of that document asks for information concerninq service in the 
armed forces. Under a subsection designated "Other details" of 
question 3, petitioner states as follows: 
-3-
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In ,lune 196'3, I1·1as confronted b•; Gli' head :JC') 1·1ho sJid 
he kne•:l I smoked "pot". I 1·1as advised bv hin that if 
a (sic) sa1·1 a doctor he w1uld not inform th'" C.O. I 1·1ent 
to the Naval Hospital the follo1·1ino rn01'nin(l and after 
tell ino the d0ctor that I soc1ked (sic) ~~t, he called 
r.1v CO. I \'las then informed that no chanes l'iOuH b2 brou1ht 
against me if I would accect an undesireahle discharne. 
Two months later I was out of the service. I never had 
any disciplinarv or complaints filed against me and other 
than this incident my service was exenolary. Subsequentlv 
the discharne was unqraded to General and as I understand 
it I am eligible for armestv and an honor~hle discharqe. 
Petitioner testified that eventuallu he received an honorable iischar0e. 
rlo evidence or testirnonv 1·1as oresented to rebut that offered 
by the Bar. Petitioner did not denv that in 1968 he snaked pot or 
attempt to explain away by any means the statenent included in his 
Bar application. Petitioner did not deny that in 1976 there ~ere 
in his aoartr1ent substantial amo•mts of 111ari.iuana and cocaine. He 
did not even offer an explanation as to why the druos were in his 
aaartment. The Hearin0 Officer and theSar Commission came to the 
logical and unrefuted conclusion that the petitioner used ~arijuana 
in 1963 1·1hile in the Harine Corps, and used mcrijuana and cocaine in 
1376, l'lhile in la\·1 school. It v1as reason~ble to assume that he used 
ille~al druqs during the interi~ period between 1963 ani 1976. It 
was also reasonable to find that, because of the ouantities of drugs 
observed in petitioner's a~artment in 197S, he intended to distribute 
the drugs for value. ilone of this \'las denied bv petitioner, although 
he had amole op~ortunitv to ~o so. 
Petitioner had the burden of establishing ~ood moral char-
acter. Everv applicant for admission to the Bar must establish that 
he or she is "of nood "loral character, and must ;Jroduce satisfactory 
testi~1onial of qood moral character; ... "U.C.i\. 73-51-10 (1953) · 
ileither the oetitioner nor an•; of his 1·1itnesses v1ere of the ooinion 
-9-
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that use of ille1al rlruos constitutes li1ck oF r:m·al character suFfi-
cient to ~revent adr·1ission to oractice la1:1. The Board of Bar 
Co~nissioners disa~reed. They concluded th~t the evidence established 
that petitioner "has an attitude of defiance of the linv rather than 
a \'lillinqness to ilbide by the la1·1," and that "in failinn to admit the 
wron~fulness of his conduct or offer anv evidence of his rehabilita-
tion strongly su~nests that he considers the aforesaid conduct orooer 
and therefore has no need for rehabilitation." (~ecord, o. G, Conclu-
sions 2 and 3). 
The Oath of an Attorney, which everv attornev ad~itted to 
oractice in the state of Utah must take and follo~ in practice, 
provides in part as follow: 
I will sup~ort the Constitution of the United States 
and the Constitution of the State of Utah, and that I will 
dischar~e the duties of Attorney and Counselor at Law 
\~ith ficiel itv: 
I will maintain the respect due to Courts of Justice 
and judicial officers;" '(ule Ill, .~evised :Oules of 
Cond~"t of the Utah State Rar. 
The evidence presented herein irrefutablv established 
that Petitioner had possessed, used and possiblv intended to sell, 
illegal drugs. Absent any further evidence, the Board of Co~~issioners 
properly found that the petitioner lacked the requisite 800d moral 
character and denied him admission to the Utah State Sar. 
CO:ICL US Fl:"-1 
The evidence ~resented by the Bar in the hearino before 
the Hearing Officer was nroperlv admitted and oetitioner was qiven 
a full and fair hearino. Petitioner failed to establ is!-] that he 
possessed the necessarv <lOOrl ~1oral character for adr1ission to the 
-10-
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Gar or to refute evidence presented b'l tr~e 13ar and Soard of Commissioners 
of the Utah State Bar properlv denied oetitioner ad~ission to the 
Bar. 
DATED this lst dav of Mav, 1973. 
~\ 
/ /- /,~.-;·- . I 
. ~/4~ 7/: ,/ c /_ -~:~ ." ?'C/' 
0 A'·1ELA. T' 'G~EE~NOOD 
Attorney for Utah State Bar 
MAILIIIG CERTIFICUE 
I hereby certify that I mailed t'o'IO true co~ies of the 
foregoing document to ~Obert D. ~oore, Attorney for Petitioner, 
at Suite 500, Ten Broadway Buildinn, Salt Lake City, Utah 34101, 
postage prepaid this C:c/ dav of ~-lay, 1978. 
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